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court has balanced the prejudicial effect of prior convictions against
their probative value to elicit the soundest of presently proposed rules.
James T. Hodge
Kenneth Gregory Haynes9"
F~mny LAw-CusToDY oF C=Rmt_.-andall Floyd James, age seven,
was taken by his divorced father to live with Randall's aunt and uncle
due to the illness of Randall's grandparents, with whom the son and
father were living. Randall's father later advised the aunt and uncle
that he was going to remarry. This news upset the aunt and uncle and
they asked Randall's father to sign a contract relinquishing custody
of Randall to them. The father refused to sign the contract. After
repeated efforts to regain custody, during which time he was prevented
on numerous occasions from seeing his son, the father instituted this
proceeding in December of 1966. The Jefferson Circuit Court,
Chancery Division, awarded custody to the aunt and uncle. The
father appealed. Held: Reversed.1 The natural parent is entitled to
the custody of his child unless it is shown that the natural parent is
unsuitable to have custody. James v. James, 457 S.W.2d 261 (Ky.
1970).
Deborah Mandelstam, age six, was placed in the custody of a
rabbi of a local Jewish temple, as a result of divorce proceedings in
Fayette Circuit Court between her parents. The chancellor found
that the mother was of such a mental condition that it would not be
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
that limited the prosecution to only disclosing whether the defendant bad been
convicted of a felony and nothing more it has been said:
The aim of protecting the witness rom needless exposure of his past is
sought to be accomplished in Florida by means of imposing restrictions
upon the examination procedure, rather than upon the definition of crimes
within the rule. If the witness admits the bare fact of his past con-
viction at the outset, he is shielded from further questioning. In practical
effect, however, this procedure neither aids the jury nor protects the
witness. Mere knowledge that the witness has been convicted of a crime
-perhaps murder, perhaps a traffic violation-will more probably mis-
lead than assist the jury. At the same time, the reputation of the
witness is subjected to doubts and suspicions that may be more damaging
than full revelation of his actual record. 15 FLA. L. REv. 220, 228
(1962).90 Mr. Haynes is a former staff member of the Kentucky Law Journal, and is
a 1970 graduate of the University of Kentucky College of Law.
1 The record did not contain any specific finding of fact as to whether the
natural parent was fit. The case was remanded on the procedural issue of burden
of proof, and findings as to the fitness of the parent or the best interests of the
child were left to the lower court.
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in the best interests and welfare of Deborah to remain with her
mother.2 The chancellor, while not finding in so many words that the
father was unfit to have custody, did find that the best interests of
the child required that she be placed in the custody of a third party.3
The father appealed. Held: Affirmed. A specific finding that a parent
is unfit is not necessary in order to award custody of a child to a third
person if it is in the best interests of the child. The best interests
of the child required that Deborah be placed in the custody of a third
party and not in the custody of her father. Mandelstam v. Mandelstam,
458 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1970).
The origin of the law's role in deciding custody disputes is usually
traced to the concept of parens patriae4 and the duty of the court to
protect the child who is unable to protect himself.5 The early com-
mon law gave the primary right of custody to the father.6 Custody
could not be taken from the father unless he intentionally "kept the
child in such degraded conditions that the child himself might become
delinquent."7 Awarding custody of the child to the mother upon the
death of the father began to erode the father's primary right to
custody. With the enactment of joint custody statutes by many of
the states, the father's exclusive right to custody was virtually legis-
lated out of existence. Joint custody statutes8 award custody of
children jointly to the father and mother, e.g.:
The father and mother shall have the joint custody . . . of their
children who are under the age of eighteen. If either of the par-
ents dies, the survivor, if suited to the trust, shall have the custody
... of the children who are under age of eighteen .... 9
These joint custody statutes have been used to arrive at a pre-
sumption in favor of the natural parents as against third parties
attempting to obtain custody from the natural parents. However,
2 Mandelstam v. Mandelstam, 458 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Ky. 1970).
8 Id. at 788.
4 Johnstone, Child Custody, I KA. L. REv. 37 (1952):
The doctrine of parens patriae is sometimes invoked by courts to
justify the states' action in custody cases. This is an old equity concept
by which the state exercises its sovereign power of guardianship over
persons under disability including children. When children are not
being properly cared for by their parents or if children become delinquent,
the state, through its courts, may use its parens patriae powers and make
custody changes. Id. at 41-42.
5 Comment, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes In-
volving Third Parties, 73 YArE L.J. 151 n.3 (1963).
6 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 11 (1950).
7 Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Cm. L. REv. 672, 676 (1942).
8 For a partial list of states ado pting joint custody statutes see 4 C. VERNnIE,
AMERCAN FAmLy LAws 18 (1936).
9 Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter KRS] § 405.020 (1) (1960).
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with the passage of the Guardianship of Infants Act, the welfare of
the child began to take precedence over the presumption in favor of
the natural parents.1 0
Child custody cases place a heavy burden on the court and the
trial judge. "A judge agonizes more about reaching the right result
in a contested custody issue than about any other type of decision he
renders."'1 The court must decide who is qualified to take custody
of the child. The trial court's duty is to
:. . ascertain all the facts and to make such an investigation as in
its judgment will assist in reaching a proper conclusion as to the
person who is best qualified to furnish a proper environment and
home for the child . . .The court should make such order as to
the infant's custody as will properly safeguard its best interests
and welfare. 12
Although there is a vast amount of statutory and case law in child
custody cases the trial judge has wide discretionary powers.13 It is
within the discretion of the trial court to decide custody matters as it
thinks justice requires and such discretion will not be reversed unless
abused.
14
Custody disputes are usually a result of two parents attempting
to obtain custody of their child after a divorce proceeding,15 or between
a natural parent and some third person. The court uses two tests
in deciding custody disputes. These tests are the "parental right"
test and the "best interest of the child" test.
The "parental right" doctrine raises a presumption that the natural
parent is best suited to have custody of the child.
The law raises a strong presumption that the child's welfare will
best be subserved in the care and control of its parents. In every
case the showing of such relationship in the absence of anything
more, makes out a prima facie case for the parents which can be
10 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 45 § 1.
Today the Guardianship of Infants Act of 1925 covers all minors and
enunciates thepiinciple that 'the court .. .shall regard the welfare of
the infant as the first and paramount consideration.' Foster & Freed,
Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 424 (1965).
11B. BoTmN, TauL JUDGE 273 (1952).
1243 CGJ.S. Infants § 8 (1945).
1327B C.J.S. Divorce § 310 (1959).
Within the restrictions imposed by statute the trial court is vested
with a large discretion in determining what is for the child's best welfare
and to whom the custody of the child should be awarded, and .. .
unless such discretion is abused, the judgment will not be disturbed.
14 Kelly v. Applewhite, 231 S.W.2d 974 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
15 For an excellent discussion of child custody in Kentucky divorce cases see
Note, Child Custody in Kentucky Divorce Cases: 1940-1952, 41 Ky. LJ. 324
(1953).
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overcome only by the most solid and substantial reasons established
by plain and certain proofs. 16
The second test used in adjudication of child custody cases is the
"best interest of the child" test. It has even been stated that the
welfare of the child is the chief consideration,17 and that the legal
right of the parent is secondary to the best interest of the child.
18
In determining best interests courts evaluate any of a large number
of factors including moral fitness of the competing parties; the
comparative physical environments offered by the parties; the
emotional ties of the child to the parties and of the parties to the
child; the age, sex and health of the child; the desirability of
maintaining continuity of the existing relationships between the
child and the third party; and the articulated preference of the
child.'9
A duty to consider the best interest of the child is sometimes placed
upon the court by statute.20
Since the child custody statutes raise a presumption that the
parent is fit to have custody of his children, the burden of proof is
usually on the other party claiming custody.21 To overcome the prima
facie case 22 made out by the parent just by proving that he or she is
the natural parent, it must be established that the right to custody
has been forfeited or that the parent is unfit.23 To show that the parent
has forfeited his natural right to custody "grave and compelling reason
must be shown, such as neglect, abandonment, incapacity, moral de-
linquency, instability of character or emotion or inability to furnish
the child with needed care."24 As a general rule child custody statutes
do not confer upon the parent an absolute right to the custody of the
child.25 "Custody is properly refused to a parent who is shown un-
16 39 Am. Jun. Parent and Child § 24 (1942).
17 24 Am. Jurt. 2d Divorce & Separation § 783 (1966).
18 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 41 (1944).
19 73 YALE L.J., supra note 5, at 153.
20 E.g., KRS § 403.070 (1968) provides in part:
At any time [after divorce] upon the petition of either parent, the court
may revise any of its orders as to the children, having principally in view
in all such cases the interest and welfare of the child.21 Berry v. Berry, 386 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1965) (burden of showing unfitness
is on person seeking to deprive natural parent of custody); Bridwell v. Coomes,
250 S.W.2d 868 (Ky. 1952) (in the absence of contract the burden of proof is on
the person other than the parent).22 Reynardus v. Garcia, 437 S.W.2d 740 (Ky. 1968) (it is presumed that the
parent is competent and suitable to rear children); Goff v. Goff, 323 S.W.2d 209
Ky. 1959) (-father has a prima facie statutory right to custody of his children
as a parent, and does not have the burden of proving his suitability).23 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 317(2) (1959).24 R. PETrmL, KENTucKY FAMILY LAw 451 (1969).25 Runions v. Powers, 258 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1953).
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worthy, unsuitable, unfit or in any way incompetent for the trust."26
In addition courts may deprive the natural parent of the custody of
his child if the best interests of the child require such action, whether
or not the parent is found to be unfit.27 In the future the parental
right test may be abandoned, just as the primary right of the father
was abandoned in earlier years.28 As the best interests of the child
test becomes more prevalent there seems to be a trend away from
awarding custody to the parents, and awarding custody to whoever
can best provide for the best interests of the child.29
In the James case the Court of Appeals found that the third party
uncle and aunt attempting to obtain custody from the natural parent
had not met the burden of proving the natural parent unfit. They
also found that the natural parent had not contracted to give up
custody of his child. In the Mandelstam case the Court found that
the best interests of the child required that Deborah Mandelstam be
placed in the custody of the third party, a Jewish rabbi. Deborah's
mother was found to have a mental condition involving severe neurotic
disorders. While the lower court did not make a specific finding that
the father was unfit, there were several findings of fact as to why the
child's best interests required that she be placed in the custody of a
third person. These findings included the fact that the father worked
nights in a laboratory and was going to hire a maid to take care of the
child during the day and that he would take the child with him to the
laboratory at night. The chancellor concluded that under this plan
there would be little family life or home relationship between the
father and the child. He also found that the father knew nothing
26 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 12 (1950).
Unfit has been defined to mean physical and mental health strength and
ability to earn necessary finances for the purpose (if not already
possessed) and good moral character. West v. West, 294 Ky. 301, -,
171 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1943).
27 "It has been recognized, moreover, that even though a parent is fit to have
custody, he may be denied custody if this is clearly inimical to the best interests
of the child." 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce & Separation § 789 (1966). "[T]he court
is not required to find the parent unfit before it can award the child to other
parent." 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 309(6) (1959).28 "Any vestige of the English rule of parental right which might exist in the
law today should be removed. The court in awarding custody of a child must
look only to the welfare of the child." Comment, 36 S. CAL. L. BRv. 255, 268
(1963). "There may be occasions where a parent's love must yield to another if
after judicial investigation it is found that the best interest of the child is sub-
served thereby." Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, -, 153 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1967).
29 Whteside, Ten Years of Kentucky Domestic Relations Law 1955-1965, 54
Ky. L.J 206 (1965):
In line with an apparent trend in other states, the Kentucky courts have
adjudicated an increasing number of cases in which an award of custody
to a third party other than the parents has been made over strong op-
position of one of the parents seeking custody. Id. at 234.
1970]
KE cKy LAW JOURNAL
about caring for a young child. The Court of Appeals concluded that
when the chancellor found that the best interests of the child required
the natural parents to be deprived of custody, he was in effect saying
that neither parent was fit or suitable to have custody of the child.
The Court of Appeals has refined a correct approach to child
custody cases. As evidenced by the James case the court still recog-
nizes that the natural parent has some rights to his child which will
not be ignored. However, as shown by Mandelstam, if the best interests
of the child require, the court will deprive the natural parent of
custody and award custody of the child to a third party. Thus the
court is not just mechanically applying the parental right test or the
best interests of the child test. This approach allows the court to make
its decision on the basis of the best interests of all involved instead of
applying one test to the exclusion of the other.
The appellant in James correctly contended that the burden of
proof was on the third party rather than the natural parent 30 While
the court should not ignore the right of the natural parent to custody
of his child, this procedural advantage to the natural parent should be
removed. Both the natural parent and the third party should be placed
on equal footing. In the context of today's adoption, separation and
divorce of natural parents, and the future complications created by
artificial insemination, this procedural advantage becomes unrealistic.
If a child has lived with some other person, this person may have
become a psychological parent 3' and have stronger bonds with the
child than the biological parent.
The principal flaw in the parental right doctrine is that it entirely
overlooks the child's present structure of relationships. The mutual
interaction between adult and child, which might be described in
such terms as love, affection, basic trust, and confidence, is con-
sidered essential for the child's successful development, and is the
basis of what may be termed psychological parenthood. It is this
psychological parenthood, rather than the biological events which
may precipitate such a relationship, which many psychologists
identify as the sine qua non of successful personality develop-
ment.... After a period of separation from the biological parent
and care by a third party, the child may learn to look upon the
latter as his psychological parent; any prior relationship with the
biological parent may deteriorate to the point where it is not only
supplanted, but also incapable of resuscitation. Where this has
happened, a change in custody based solely on biological relation-
ship might, by disrupting the existing relationships of psychological
30 Supra note 22.31 Foster & Freed, supra note 10, at 437: "It takes little familiarity with
current literature in psychiatry, psychology, and the behavioral sciences to
realize that the shibboleth that 'blood is thicker than water is untrue."
[Vol. 59
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parenthood, work considerable emotional harm upon the child; it
could even cause him to refuse ... the new relationship.
32
Additionally, both parties should be required to affirmatively prove
they are capable of rearing a child in the "revolutionary age" of today.
In Mandelstam the court correctly concluded that a specific finding
that the natural parent is unfit is not necessary.3 3 In effect, however,
both parents were shown to be unfit. By awarding custody to a third
person, the court showed that it is not bound by the parental right
doctrine and will, if the best interests of the child require, deprive the
natural parent of custody.
The best interests of the child test considers more factors than the
parental right test. The parental right test often ignores, or at least
relegates the child to a secondary position while the fitness of the
parents is litigated. The best interests test is broader than merely
determining the fitness of the parent since it requires an investigation
of the entire situation. The best interests of the child test also avoids
the stigma of labeling a parent unfit in order to give custody to some-
one else.3 4
Although the best interests of the child test requires more investi-
gation, courts do not always make a thorough investigation.
When one reviews a number of recent cases involving custody
awards, the conclusion becomes inescapable that as a group they
are marked by question begging, rigid rules, and platitudes which
unfortunately tend to inhibit careful inquiry and thorough evalua-
tion. It is a matter of grave concern that in an area of such great
human and social importance courts are failing to lay down rules
sufficiently precise for meaningful guidance and often insulating
themselves from relevant expert advice and information.3 5
A panel of experts in child welfare might be capable of making a more
thorough investigation than is the trial judge. This panel might also
be better able to determine the best interests of the child than a trial
judge who alone must interpret the information relayed to him by the
parties and witnesses involved in the custody dispute. If the decision
is to be left with the trial judge, it should not be his decision alone.
The trial judge should be required to use all the sociologists, psychol-
ogists, welfare workers and interested community individuals to dis-
cover the best interests of all concerned. Kentucky, by statute, has
enabled judges to appoint advisory committees in divorce cases.3 6
32 73 YALE L.J., supra note 5, at 158-59.
33 Watson v. Watson, 434 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. 1968). See note 27 supra.
34H. CLAru, LAw oF Doumsrxc RELATiONS 592 (1968).
31 Foster & Freed, supra note 10, at 427.
36KRS § 403.033 (1966).
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This statute should be amended to include all child custody cases, not
just those that are the result of divorce proceedings.
The best interests of the child test is based on vague standards.
Standards such as moral fitness, comparative physical environments
and emotional ties are very difficult to define. These standards can
also be very subjective due to the wide discretionary power of the
judge. The best interests of the child test could become, in the dis-
cretion of a particular trial judge, a financial best interest test. If a
judge subjectively decided that a factor of physical environment such
as wealth was the most important interest of the child then the party
with the most financial resources would be awarded custody.
The best interests of the child test is inevitably artificial and tends
to reach unfair and even vicious results when applied in fact
unless one uses this test as a philosophical concept, and thinks of
the child in an abstract or ideal sense, as an Hegelian might do.37
An advisory committee working with the trial judge would be more
likely to be objective in a custody award than the trial judge alone.
Only by a thorough investigation of the best interests of all the parties
can parental rights and the child's best interests be balanced to
determine the award of custody to the proper party.
William Edward Hudson
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-KENTucKx's 'hIvTLrED CoNSENT" STATUE-BE-
vocATiNo OF MoToR VEmCr= OPERATog's LICENSE FOR REFUSAL TO TA E
BLOOD ALCOHOL TEsT.--"There has been a long felt need for further
legislation to clear the highways . . . of the intoxicated driver. A
mounting toll yearly in injured and dead has been his responsibility."'
The drinking driver creates a serious threat to the safety and protection
of lives of persons on our nation's highways. Several studies indicate
that ten to fifteen percent of all accidents involve a drinking driver,
and fifty percent of the drivers judged to be at fault in fatal accidents
have been drinking.2
37 Sayre, supra note 7, at 683.
1 Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, -, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 121 (Sup. Ct.
1954). For other cases in which the problem of the drinking driver has been
noted, see Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, -, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (Sup.
Ct. 1955); Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20, -, 140 N.W.2d 603, 606 (1956); State v.
Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, -, 202 A.2d 267, 269 (1964).
2 HOUSE Comm. oN PUBLIC Wonxs, 90TH CONG., 2D Sass., 1968 Aiconor.
ANDHIGHvAY SAFETY REPoRT 11-15 (Comm. Print 1968); Ky. LEGisL&TIvERE-
sEAECn CommissioN, TRAFFIC SArTY: THz DRUI ING Draim, PmEECH REPORT
No. 36 at 2, 9 (Sept. 1967).
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